Anomaly Detection with HMM Gauge Likelihood Analysis by Lorbeer, Boris et al.
Anomaly Detection with
HMM Gauge Likelihood Analysis
Boris Lorbeer, Tanja Deutsch, Peter Ruppel, Axel Ku¨pper
Service-centric Networking
Technische Universita¨t Berlin
Berlin Deutschland
lorbeer@tu-berlin.de, tanja.deutsch@tu-berlin.de, peter.ruppel@tu-berlin.de, axel.kuepper@tu-berlin.de
Abstract—This paper describes a new method, HMM gauge
likelihood analysis, or GLA, of detecting anomalies in discrete
time series using Hidden Markov Models and clustering. At
the center of the method lies the comparison of subsequences.
To achieve this, they first get assigned to their Hidden Markov
Models using the Baum-Welch algorithm. Next, those models
are described by an approximating representation of the prob-
ability distributions they define. Finally, this representation is
then analyzed with the help of some clustering technique or
other outlier detection tool and anomalies are detected. Clearly,
HMMs could be substituted by some other appropriate model,
e.g. some other dynamic Bayesian network. Our learning
algorithm is unsupervised, so it doesn’t require the labeling
of large amounts of data. The usability of this method is
demonstrated by applying it to synthetic and real-world syslog
data.
Keywords-Anomaly Detection, Hidden Markov Models, clus-
tering, t-SNE, LSTM
I. INTRODUCTION
The detection of anomalies in data is currently one of the
most important practical applications of unsupervised learn-
ing. It helps companies to understand their data better, to find
hidden flaws in complex systems, and to react early to the
emergence of unexpected situations. The assumption here is
that anything that is anomalous is potentially indicating some
kind of failure, malicious behavior, or otherwise exceptional
incident that needs attending to. While anomalous patterns
can occur in all kinds of data, in this paper we are exclu-
sively dealing with anomaly detection in time series. One
important example of time series data in a complex system
would be the logging data in a computer network. Today the
computer networks of large companies can easily consist of
several thousands of machines, each one running a wide
range of applications that often use the logging framework
syslogd to log their status and important events. This is,
of course, a valuable source for diagnostics and predictive
maintenance.
The thorough analysis of large amounts of data is usually
hampered by mainly two problems: first, the amount of data
is often too huge for humans to read through, and second,
the experts which can interpret the data are usually very
hard to find. Thus, it would be very helpful, if this analysis
could be automated, at least partially. One approach often
used is that of anomaly detection: use machine learning
to learn models that describe the normal behavior and
then label those patterns, that cannot be described well
by the learned models, as anomalous. The advantages of
anomaly detection are that large amounts of data can be
processed automatically and that no experts are necessary.
Moreover, anomaly detection algorithms can often detect
strange patterns in data that look innoxious even to an expert.
Also, the algorithms used in this paper are unsupervised, i.e.
they don’t need labeled data for learning, which for large
data is in general very difficult to obtain. The disadvantage
is, that it is often difficult to determine the threshold of how
anomalous an event has to be for being noted as an anomaly,
and that depending on this threshold, we might obtain too
many false positives or too many false negatives. And, of
course, there is always the possibility of rare but harmless
events, as well as critical events that have a high frequency;
anomaly detection cannot help in those situations and other
methods have to be applied.
There are many different types of anomalies possible,
as there are many different types of patterns that data can
contain, and violations of those patterns can be considered
anomalies. One very simple pattern in time series data that
could be exploited is the simple presence of certain events.
And if some events are usually not present, i.e. have a low
frequency, their occurrence would then be considered an
anomaly. Thus, one conceptually very easy anomaly detec-
tion method is the frequency analysis of events. We specify
a threshold for the frequency, and any event frequency
below this threshold is considered an anomaly and this
rare event should be examined more closely. The threshold
itself depends on the given situation and should be adapted
accordingly. So in this case, the “machine learning” part
simply consists in recording the frequencies of events and
then applying a threshold.
Other patterns, that could be used for time series anomaly
detection are the ratios, or more general linear dependencies
of event counts, for example within a certain time window.
That means, contrary to the example above, here we don’t
just consider individual events but rather aggregations of
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events. One way of implementing this is by using PCA on
event counts (Xu et al., 2010a).
Yet another type of pattern is the consecution of events.
Thus, while the pattern in this case also consists of aggre-
gations of events as the ratio pattern above, now also the
order of events is relevant. So, for example, if our event
time series consists of two events in the form (A, B, A, B,
A, B, ...) and then suddenly there would appear the sequence
(A, A, A, B, B, B), the ratio anomaly detection would not
be triggered, but the order anomaly detection would. This
variant has been investigated in many papers, and it is also
the focus of the current paper.
The method that is described in this paper could be
delineated shortly as follows: We consider one long time
series of events and cut it into a series of smaller sequences
that are all of the same length, e.g. 20 events long. To de-
scribe them properly, we map them to their Hidden Markov
Models (HMM). Two sequences are then considered similar
if their HMMs are similar. Since HMMs are non-identifiable,
comparing them is nontrivial. We consider them as proba-
bility distributions over the space of event sequences. So
we take a few, e.g. 10, fixed event sequences and compute
their probabilities wrt. the HMMs, creating a vector of
probabilities for each HMM. If those vectors are similar
for two HMMs, it is likely that the HMMs have similar
probability distributions and thus are similar themselves.
This, in turn, means, that their original event sequences
are similar. Thus, we have a nontrivial feature engineering
scheme, that maps sequences to vectors of probabilities
that can then be searched for outliers, e.g. by clustering
algorithms that detect outliers like for instance HDBSCAN
or simply by visually inspecting the two-dimensional t-SNE
projection.
We demonstrate this method with synthetic data as well
as real-world syslog data.
II. RELATED WORK
Here we give a very short and rather incomplete review of
the literature on anomaly detection for time series data with
a finite value space. For a more comprehensive overview,
see e.g. (Chandola et al., 2012).
The approach most often used in anomaly detection with
machine learning is to learn a model from the normal
patterns and then to declare all patterns, to which the model
assigns very low probability, to be anomalous.
Some authors partition the time into intervals and consider
histograms of the frequencies of the events in each window,
which results in a collection of histograms. Since the value
(event) space is finite, those histograms are points in a finite-
dimensional vector space. This collection of points can now
be approximated with PCA and points very far away from
the PCA subspace will be labeled anomalous. This idea
is exploited for example in (Xu et al., 2010a), (Xu et al.,
2009), and (Xu et al., 2010b). In those papers, neither the
sequential ordering inside the windows nor the order of the
windows themselves is used, only the linear relations of the
frequencies of nearby events are taken into account.
If we want to include the order of events in our analysis,
we enter the realm of time series analysis. One very powerful
tool in time series analysis are Hidden Markov Models
(HMMs) and so it is not surprising that they have been
used a lot for this kind of anomaly detection. There are
many different variants in which HMMs can enter the scene.
The most popular approach is to compute an HMM for the
normal data and then compute for all new data sequences
their probabilities wrt. this HMM. If the probability of the
sequence is too small, i.e. is below a carefully chosen thresh-
old, the sequence is labeled as anomalous. This method can
be found for example in (Chandola et al., 2012), (Lane and
Brodley, 2003), (Joshi and Phoha, 2005), (Khreich et al.,
2009), (Khreich et al., 2010), (Lane and Brodley, 2003)
or (Wang et al., 2004). A similar idea can be found in
(Dorj et al., 2013), which replaces HMMs with Bayesian
HMMs. The problem with all those techniques is that they
are not very good in modeling multiple types of sequences.
They work best if there is just one main sequential structure
present in the normal data. However, we are interested in
situations of long sequences that can display several different
patterns and it turned out that this method does not give
usable results.
HMMs are often interpreted as finding, to the given ob-
served sequence, an underlying sequence of “hidden” states,
which are thought of as causing the observations. Often, the
HMM is chosen to have fewer values in the hidden states
than in the observations, which makes the hidden sequence
less complex and easier to compute with. One interpretation
could be that the observations are the states with added
noise. This point of view leads to the idea of replacing the
observed sequence with the sequence of hidden states and
then doing anomaly detection on this one (for example by
comparing them to a database of labeled sequences, using
an appropriate similarity measure). For work along this line
of reasoning, see e.g. (Chandola et al., 2012) or (Chandola
et al., 2008), and references therein. However, this method,
too, suffers from the drawbacks described before and is not
usable for our purposes.
One problem with HMMs is that with longer sequences
with many states, computations become slow and sometimes
lead to arithmetic underflow. In (Florez-Larrahondo et al.,
2005) they developed an iterative version of HMMs that
alleviates those problems.
Another problem is the choice of the number of hidden
states. Most often, this parameter is simply tuned according
to what works best in the given situation. A more principled
approach is taken by (Khreich et al., 2009), which choose a
combination of HMMs with different state counts by using
the “Maximum Realizable ROC” technique. Then again, the
anomalies are detected via a carefully chosen probability
threshold. An extension of this scheme can be found in
(Khreich et al., 2010). One further approach to anomaly
detection that uses combinations of HMMs is demonstrated
in (Yamanishi and Maruyama, 2005) which uses mixtures
of HMMs. The machinery described is quite complex.
However, the clustering described there did not work well
with our data. We think that is due to two problems: first, the
number of components needs to be provided to the algorithm
and the dynamic selection of this number described in the
paper was not very robust. Second, the range of possible
shapes of clusters is bounded and cannot be as arbitrary as
with e.g. HDBSCAN.
Of course, today, with the rise of deep learning (Good-
fellow et al., 2016) in almost all fields of machine learning,
there are also applications of this new paradigm to anomaly
detection. Some work has been published in this area in
the last few years, but we will not go into detail here
and only mention two general approaches. One considers
anomaly detection simply as a classification problem (i.e.
is only applicable to labeled data), and can thus apply
one of the standard deep neural network architectures for
supervised learning. E.g. in (Javaid et al., 2016), they train
a deep sparse autoencoder network. Another approach does
anomaly detection via time series prediction. It learns Re-
current Neural Networks (RNNs) (Sutskever, 2013) for the
event sequences, computes the probability distribution over
all possible extrapolations for the next few steps and labels
sequences that have low probability with respect to this
distribution as anomalous. Quite a number of papers follow
this scheme, see e.g. (Malhotra et al., 2015), (Chauhan
and Vig, 2015), or (Shipmon et al., 2017), to name only
three. A clear advantage of Recurrent Neural Networks,
especially Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) models, see
(Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997), is that they can much
better remember past events than HMMs can. One clear
disadvantage of deep neural networks is the often large
amount of effort necessary to get the network to converge to
a good model. Since anomaly detection via prediction can be
done with any prediction method, classical or deep learning,
it might be interesting for us to compare the prediction
performance of all kinds of prediction models. This has been
done several times, for recent results see e.g. (Makridakis
et al., 2018b), the NN3 competition (Crone et al., 2005), and
the M4 competition (Makridakis et al., 2018a). In general,
deep learning seems like a promising direction for anomaly
detection in time series, especially if long term correlations
between events are present.
III. HMM GAUGE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS
We are concerned with the problem of finding anomalies
in discrete time series. In this paper, we consider only batch
processing: first, the time series data is collected, let’s say
for one whole day, and then this complete batch of data
is processed together. The scenario is that of a long time
series, i.e. a continuous stream of discrete data, that most
of the time behaves normal but at rare occasions digresses
from that normal pattern of behavior. Our task is to find
those anomalies since they are likely to be of importance
e.g. for predictive maintenance. One example would be the
syslog events written by a given application. As long as
the application always logs the same sequences of events,
everything is fine. However, if this pattern suddenly changes,
we would like to know about this change.
The first point to make is that we will not consider the
complete time series T as a whole, but rather subsequences
tk thereof. To be more precise: for i, j ∈ N, i ≤ j, let the
index set I i: j be the set of integers {i, i+1, . . . , j}. Moreover,
let E be the set of possible events we can observe. Then
we consider all the subsequences tnk of length n of the
total sequence T of length N that are obtained by sliding
a window of size n with a step size m over the domain of
T , i.e.:
T : I1:N → E
tnk : I1:n→ E, n ∈N, n≤ N, k = 1,2, . . . ,b(N+m−n)/mc
tnk (l) := T (l+(k−1)m), l ∈ I1:n,
(1)
where we often omit the superscript n. Note that at the end of
T we don’t keep windows that are incomplete (in case N−n
is not dividable by m). The window size n should be a small
multiple of the expected maximal autocorrelation distance,
so the model has a chance to learn those correlations. As
the window shift size m we usually choose half the window
size: n/2.
It is those subsequences tk that we want to compare.
Usually, most are similar to each other and some are
different and the latter are the anomalies. The common
length n of those subsequences should not be too small,
such that they will still contain a sufficient amount of
most of the behavioral patterns. On the other hand, because
of computational constraints like arithmetic underflow and
computation time, the length cannot be too large. Thus, this
parameter has to be tuned according to the situation at hand.
Our next step is to find a way to compare the subse-
quences tk,k= 1, . . . ,K. Unfortunately, comparing sequences
to each other is not trivial. We could, for example, compare
two sequences tr = (tri)ni=1 and ts = (tsi)
n
i=1 by taking the
Euclidean distance between those two vectors: dE(tr, ts) =√
∑ni=1 |tri− tsi|2. But this measure has several flaws. For
example, this would mean that two sequences that just
differ by a simple time shift could be considered com-
pletely different. There are several possible approaches to
measuring the similarity of sequences that avoid this and
similar problems. Our choice in this paper is to compare two
sequences by comparing the HMMs that have been learned
from them using the Baum-Welch algorithm. HMMs are an
appropriate model in this situation since they are simple
enough to be tractable, yet sufficiently versatile to capture
the idiosyncrasies of the sequences they have been fitted
to. This has been shown by numerous applications of this
popular model. E.g., they are, contrary to ordinary Markov
chains, capable of detecting longer lasting autocorrelations.
For a good introduction to HMMs, see e.g. (Rabiner, 1989),
(Bishop, 2006), or (Prince, 2012).
To assign a HMM model to each sequence tk, we have to
choose a number of hidden states. Again, this needs to be
tuned for the given problem. The trade off here is similar to
that for the length of the sequence: large numbers of hidden
states on the one hand provide more powerful models, which
for example can remember further back in the past, but on
the other hand lead to high computational costs.
Unfortunately, HMMs cannot be compared just by com-
paring the model parameters. Indeed, it is well known that
HMMs are non-identifiable, i.e. there are different sets of
model parameters that define equivalent models. To under-
stand this, first note that statistical models such as HMMs
assign a probability to each possible data input, in our case
to each possible sequence of the same length n as the HMM.
More formally: Let n be the chosen length of the event
sequences. Also, recall that In is the index set containing
the first n natural numbers In := {1, . . . ,n}, and that E is the
set of all possible events that can happen. Then:
Sn = {s|s : In→ E} (2)
is the set of all possible event sequences of length n with
event space E. Of course, our original subsequences tk are
also contained in this set: tk ∈ Sn,k = 1, . . . ,K. Further, let
θ be the vector containing all the parameters of an HMM,
and let h(θ) be the belonging HMM. Then each HMM h(θ)
of length n defines a probability distribution function (PDF)
ph(θ) over Sn:
ph(θ) : Sn→ [0,1], ∑
s∈Sn
ph(θ)(s) = 1. (3)
Now, for any practical purposes, two HMMs h(θ1) and h(θ2)
are indistinguishable if they define the same PDF over Sn:
h(θ1) = h(θ2) := ∀s∈S ph(θ1)(s) = ph(θ2)(s). (4)
Indeed, they should be considered equal, since there is no
experiment that can prove them different. In general, models
with the property that different model parameters θ1 and θ2
can lead to the same probability distribution are called non-
identifiable. Now, as mentioned above, HMMs happen to
have this property, i.e., with the above notation:
∃θ1,θ2,θ1 6=θ2 h(θ1) = h(θ2). (5)
One very simple example is that we can single out two
states and then switch in the transition matrix the belonging
two rows and columns, and in the emission matrix the two
rows belonging to the two states. This will not change the
probability distribution but the parameters will in general
change. This can, of course, be done with any arbitrary
permutation of states. Note, however, that there are many
more ways in which identifiability is violated in HMMs,
not just via permutations. For more background on non-
identifiability of HMMs and its algebraic geometrical struc-
ture see e.g. (Watanabe, 2001) and (Hosino et al., 2005). The
important implication for our purposes is that the parameters
of HMMs cannot be used to compare them since models
that are similar or equivalent can have very different sets of
parameters.
The above explanation takes the approach of viewing
statistical models, and in our case HMMs in particular, as
probability distributions over the data. And this view is also
what leads us to the feature map that we choose in our
approach. Ideally, we would take as features the probability
distributions ph(θ) themselves. But, of course, comparing
probability distributions is not realistic because of the large
size of Sn even for moderately sized n and E. Thus, instead
of comparing the probabilities of each and every single
sequence s∈ Sn, only a small number m of them is selected.
Those chosen sequences then define a map ` from the set of
HMM models H to Rm. More formally: Let G be the set
of sequences chosen to compare HMMs:
G = {g1, . . . ,gm}, gi ∈ Sn, i = 1, . . . ,m. (6)
Then the map ` is defined as follows:
` :H →Rm,
`(h) := (ph(g1), . . . , ph(gm)) ∈Rm.
(7)
The sequences gi ∈ G are the basis for comparing the
HMMs, i.e. they gauge our comparisons. Because of this,
we will refer to those sequences as gauge sequences.
Thus, for the comparison of two models h(θ1) and h(θ2),
we don’t use their parameters θ1 and θ2 but rather their
images under ` in Rm. As far as the choice of gauge
sequences is concerned, we investigated two approaches.
One was choosing a couple of sequences at random. The
number of random gauge sequences was not very important
as long as it was not below five. The other approach was to
use the original sequences themselves. In our experiments,
the latter approach showed slightly better cluster separation
properties, while requiring more computation time.
To summarize, instead of comparing the sequences di-
rectly, we use a feature map that assigns each sequence to
a point in an m-dimensional cube [0,1]m where m is the
number of gauge sequences, and then analyze those image
points instead. To detect outliers in this feature space we
first apply t-SNE (Maaten and Hinton, 2008) to map the
points into R2 and then use HDBSCAN (Campello et al.,
2013). It has turned out that using t-SNE before clustering
gives superior results. Moreover, the projection to a two-
dimensional space allows for easy visualization.
We refer to this method of outlier analysis as HMM gauge
likelihood analysis, or GLA for short.
IV. APPLICATION TO SYNTHETIC AND REAL DATA
We evaluated the method on synthetic data as well as real-
world data. The results on real-world data were compared
with those of a popular deep learning anomaly detection
method.
Synthetic data: We have created 60 sequences of length
20, each consisting of the subsequence (A, B, C, D),
concatenated five times with small noise added by randomly
selecting two elements from each sequence that were altered
randomly. Next, we added two anomalous sequences, one
which had the order of events reversed, i.e. the sequence
was now a repetition of (D, C, B, A), and a second one
which was simply a constant sequence, i.e. just 20 times the
element A.
Then GLA was applied to this data, using 10 hidden states
for the HMMs and ten gauge sequences. The points in the
feature space were then projected into R2 using t-SNE, see
Figure 1. The two outliers are clearly visible near the left
edge and the left lower edge of the plot.
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Figure 1. A 2D t-SNE plot of simulated data: 60 normal sequences in the
upper right corner and two anomalous ones on the left and bottom left.
Another experiment with simulated data is to test the
capability of HMMs to remember further back in time than
just the previous event, i.e. that they are more powerful than
just Markov Chains. For this, we created 500 copies of the
sequence t1 and one single copy of sequence t2:
t1 =(A, A, B, B, A, A, B, B, A, A, B, B,
A, A, B, B, A, A, B, B, A)
t2 =(A, A, A, A, A, A, B, B, B, B, B, B,
A, B, A, B, A, B, A, B, A).
(8)
Learning a Markov chain on either of those two series would
result in the same transition matrix, namely the matrix with
all entries equal to 0.5. So a Markov chain model would not
be capable to distinguish between those two time series.
However, both sequences have clearly different structure
which should be detectable for models with memory at
least two steps back in the past. The HMM models were
configured with four states to be able to remember two steps
back. See Figure 2 for the result.
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Figure 2. A 2D t-SNE plot of simulated data: 500 normal sequences in
the long snake-shaped cluster and one anomalous one near the middle is
clearly separated.
The image of the anomalous sequence is clearly visible
as an outlier near the middle of the figure.
Real data: Since there is no standard benchmark data
for anomaly detection, especially not for syslog data, we
used as real data syslog files collected from a Linux laptop
and examined those for anomalies. First, some preprocessing
was done. There are lots of syslog events that are of the same
type and differ only in some details like an IP address or a
URL. Most of the time, those details are not relevant and one
would like to reduce all those variants into just one single
“event type”. For example, a server might get connection
requests from thousands of clients and the belonging syslog
events would only differ in the URLs of the clients. We
would like all those connection requests to be always the
same event type, just repeatedly logged.
One could understand this like a clustering of events
where we are only interested in the cluster id, which would
then be the event type. This clustering in itself is already a
nontrivial task and there are several ways to approach this
problem, see for example (Vaarandi, 2003) and (Vaarandi
and Pihelgas, 2015).
We used a simpler method: from each syslog line, the
first three words of the description field that are each at
least three characters long and don’t contain any numbers
or special characters are extracted as features. The intuition
behind this is that the irrelevant details usually show up more
towards the end of the log entry and there are rarely two
events which coincide in the first three non-numeric words
and yet belong to different event types. Verification on the
data confirmed that this was a reasonable technique. Below,
this will be referred to as the “three first words” feature.
To evaluate GLA, we applied it to the syslog events of
several applications. Since our data was not labeled, we
had to go through the sequences ourselves and label the
anomalies before evaluating our results.
The first example we will discuss here is for the applica-
tion dhclient. The data contains 46,757 dhclient events, each
being one of 9 different event types in the three first words
feature. From this sequence, we extracted subsequences over
sliding windows of length 20 with shift distance 10. In
our manual inspection, we labeled 71 sequences as outliers
which were due to rare individual events they contained (we
call those “frequential anomalies”). But we did not find any
sequence that contained common events in a singular order
(we call those “sequential anomalies”).
On each of those dhclient subsequences, we trained an
HMM with 20 hidden states. The clustered t-SNE plot of
GLA is shown in Figure 3. The clustering resulted in 51
outliers, all of them belonging to the 71 labeled outliers.
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Figure 3. This shows the t-SNE plot of GLA for the application dhclient
(sliding window size: 20, shift 10, possible symbols: 9, hidden states:
20), clustered with HDBSCAN. The minimum cluster size parameter of
HDBSCAN was set to 20. There are 51 outliers.
The next example we discuss is for the application nm-
dispatcher: the data contained 25,352 such events, and again
subsequences were extracted with a sliding window of size
20 and a shift distance of 10. The three first words feature
for this application gives 16 different event types. Manual
labeling let to 34 outliers, consisting of 3 sequential and
31 frequential anomalies. Here, we trained HMMs with 32
hidden states. See Figure 4 for the belonging plot.
400 300 200 100 0 100
200
150
100
50
0
50
100
Figure 4. This shows the t-SNE plot of GLA for the application nm-
dispatcher (sliding window size: 20, shift 10, possible symbols: 16, hidden
states: 32), clustered with HDBSCAN. The minimum cluster size parameter
of HDBSCAN was set to 20. There are 7 outliers.
GLA detected seven outliers, one from the sequential
outliers, five from the frequential outliers, and one unlabeled
one. As usual, the very far outliers, like the one here in the
lower left corner, are frequential outliers.
Finally, we investigate the whoopsie application with one
sequential outlier and six frequential outliers. See Figure 5
for the visualization of GLA.
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Figure 5. This shows the t-SNE plot of GLA for the application whoopsie
(sliding window size: 20, shift 10, possible symbols: 15, hidden states:
32), clustered with HDBSCAN. The minimum cluster size parameter of
HDBSCAN was set to 20. There are 2 outliers.
Two anomalies where detected. The outlier at the lower
right is a frequential outlier, while the one at the middle
right is the sequential outlier.
The first five lines of the following table summarize the
results.
dhclient nm-disp whoopsie
false pos. 0 1 0
false neg. 20 28 5
recall 5171 = 0.72
6
34 = 0.18
2
7 = 0.28
precision 5151 = 1
6
7 = 0.86
2
2 = 1
GLA: F1 0.84 0.30 0.44
LSTM: F1 0.78 0.31 0.40
Obviously, those numbers heavily depend on our choice
of the minimum cluster size of HDBSCAN. We preferred
choices with less false positives. The parameter was tuned
for each application separately.
We compared those results with a popular deep learning
anomaly detection method, see (Malhotra et al., 2015).
As discussed above, it uses LSTMs to compute prediction
probabilities and if those probabilities, evaluated for the
actual sequence, are smaller than a certain threshold, it is
considered an anomaly. We used an LSTM of length 20
with 256 units per cell, stacked four times. This model was
applied to the three event sequences described above. For
comparison with the results for GLA, the threshold for the
prediction probabilities was chosen to maximize the F1 score
while producing the same number of false positives as GLA.
The F1 scores of LSTM have been entered into the last row
of the above table. We see that our GLA method outperforms
the LSTM model in the first and third case, while in the
second case the results are almost identical.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced GLA, a new method to detect
anomalies in time series data. It computes the HMMs for
subsequences and then compares those HMMs with each
other by comparing their probability distributions. This is
done by computing the probabilities of those HMMs on
a vector of gauge sequences and then detecting outliers in
the t-SNE projection using appropriate clustering algorithms.
The method has been successfully tested with Linux syslog
data. The experiments show that the method detects not only
rare event anomalies but also sequential anomalies.
VI. FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have just described the first version of
our method, the proof of concept. There are several ways
to improve on the current version. The algorithm has still
many parameters that need to be chosen, like the size of the
subsequences, the number of gauge sequences, the size of
the gauge sequences, the number of states of the HMMs,
the outlier detection method, and the belonging parameters
of this method, such as the minimum cluster size in the case
of HDBSCAN. One should investigate to which extend the
choice of those parameters can be automated, maybe even
learned.
Furthermore, it would be beneficial to see whether other
projection methods besides t-SNE, for example UMAP,
could improve speed and outlier separation. This should
be investigated in tandem with a search for an optimal
clustering algorithm for this task.
A very interesting research topic would also be to compare
different dynamic Bayesian networks besides HMMs for
capturing the sequential patterns in a given population of
time series.
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